(forthcoming in European Journal for Philosophy of Religion)


Arguments from divine hiddenness attempt to show that God, as understood by traditional theists, does not exist. Eleonore Stump has claimed that, contrary to a key premise in such arguments, it is possible for God to have a personal relationship with human beings who do not believe that he exists. In this paper I describe Stump’s defense of divine hiddenness, as well as her account of the human will. I show that her account of the knowledge of persons does not solve the problem of divine hiddenness. I also argue that Stump’s account of the will commits her to the claim that nonbelief in God entails resistance to God. I conclude with a few potential replies and my own responses to them.

Papers under Review

How to Collaborate Well

(revised and resubmitted)


How do we collaborate with others? Perhaps more importantly, how do we collaborate well with others? In this paper, I will attempt to answer this second question. The term ‘collaboration’ is used across a wide range of contexts to describe a variety of activities. Yet, we seem to point to particular cases of collaboration with ease. We can also easily distinguish paradigmatic cases of collaboration from cases which obviously fail to count as collaboration at all, and from cases which fail to count as ideal collaboration. In this paper, I look at cases of good collaboration, cases in which persons collaborate well with one another, to determine what is needed to collaborate well. In this paper, I first discuss two famous cases of ideal collaboration in detail, one in the sciences and the other in the arts. I then proceed to describe the similarities between these cases, such as the openness and respect between collaborators, the flexibility in the shared plans of the collaborators, and the thoughtful criticism and debate that occurs within good collaboration. These characteristics of the two cases help us understand why we take them to be cases of good collaboration. The conclusion of the paper is that collaborating well involves shared norms, a shared vision, and the open-mindedness and thoughtful disagreement that both come with mutual respect among participants.

(under review)


Since the inception of analytic social epistemology, some have attempted to characterize the precise nature of the field. In this paper, I discuss the foundational features of social epistemology, as described by other social epistemologists. I then detail Alvin Goldman’s taxonomy of social epistemology and defend my own version, arguing that each phenomenon described in the literature to date can be fitted into one of three categories. These categories of social-epistemic phenomena are epistemic systems, group epistemic states, and information exchange. I describe each of these categories in depth, in order to show precisely how various phenomena fit into such categories. Finally, I detail a few theories in social epistemology that extend beyond these three categories, showing a way for epistemologists to move beyond the tripartite taxonomy.

Papers in Progress

The Epistemic Value of Social Cognition

(undergoing revisions)


Testimony, an essentially social activity, can provide an epistemic basis for believing propositions testified. In this paper, I argue that other social phenomena have this capacity as well. First, I outline various ways in which social phenomena can affect our knowledge. I describe testimony, and I explain how it can affect knowledge production. I then show by example that social cognition can impact knowledge in an epistemically significant way. Social-cognitive mechanisms can generate knowledge of other minds as well as knowledge of the external world. Moreover, the social interactions that produce social cognition can act as a basis for those beliefs. The epistemic significance of social cognition demonstrates the prevalence of activities that deserve examination by social epistemologists.

(in progress)


In this paper, I defend the claim that religious experiences can generate knowledge of God. First, I describe a few accounts of religious knowledge, and I describe and defend an analogy between religious experiences and social cognition, which sheds light on how religious experience can produce genuine knowledge. I then argue that the physical mechanisms that generate knowledge of other minds may also be used to generate knowledge of God. I draw on al-Ghazali’s writings on Islamic mysticism, as well as contemporary studies in the neuroscience of putative religious experiences and on studies of social cognition.